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ABSTRACT This paper deals with the topic of risk management in Public–Private Partnership
(PPP). The analysis of the related literature reveals that risks must be analyzed and managed on
a context-specific approach, and that there is a lack of a comprehensive study on the appropriate
risk mitigation strategies for each risk embedded in PPP projects. Focusing on the transport
sector, based on the results of a Delphi survey, the paper provides guidelines for both public and
private parties in defining a list of significant risks in PPP motorway projects, and identifying for
them both the effective allocation and the suitable mitigation strategies. Results of the Delphi
survey have been compared with the common practices on risk management applied in eight real
motorway PPP projects.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the increasing need for the development of infrastructure and
budgetary constraints in several developing and developed countries have led
governments to seek new ways of financing facilities of public utility. One of the
options is to involve private sector finance and expertise in the provision of
public infrastructure and services through Public–Private Partnership (PPP).
PPP can provide a variety of benefits to the government, by providing more-
efficient, lower-cost and reliable public facilities; by improving the quality and effi-
ciency of infrastructure services, and by promoting local economic growth and
employment opportunities. However, at its heart, it remains the risk-management
problem due to the high-degree risks affecting PPP projects that are usually
characterized by many stakeholders, huge amounts of investments, long conces-
sion periods and so on. These risks are not borne by one party, but should be
allocated to the party (public or private) who is best able to manage them.
In last years, an interesting volume of literature on risk management in PPP
projects, both academic (Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005; Grimsey
& Lewis, 2004; Li, 2003; Ng & Loosemore, 2007) and technical (see, for instance,
technical reports provided on the US Federal Highway Administration web
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site), has been developed. Yet, the analysis of the literature reveals that risks must
be analyzed and managed on a context-specific approach, and that there is a lack
of a comprehensive study on the more suitable risk mitigation strategies for each
risk embedded in PPP projects. Focusing on a specific PPP sector, namely the
transport sector, the present paper aims at filling this gap by providing guidelines
for both public and private parties in defining a list of significant risks in PPP
motorway projects, and identifying for them both the effective allocation and
the suitable mitigation strategies.
With this aim, a Delphi survey is conducted with two panels of experts repre-
sentative of both private and public parties, and various countries. Furthermore,
the results of the Delphi survey have been compared with the common inter-
national practices on risk management drawn from a multiple-case study con-
ducted on eight real cases of motorway PPP projects.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly resumes the literature on
risk management in PPPs, reviewing the contributions on risk identification, allo-
cation and mitigation. Section 3 presents the research design. Section 4 discusses
the Delphi results, while Section 5 compares them with the risk-management
practices adopted in the analyzed case studies. Conclusions end the paper.
2. Risk Identification, Allocation and Mitigation in PPP: A Literature
Review
PPP projects usually involve higher degree of risks than conventional procure-
ment, since they are characterized by many stakeholders, a huge amount of invest-
ments and long concession periods (Wei-hua & Da-shuang, 2006). Therefore, PPP
projects involve not only risks that are project-related but also risks that depend on
the inner characteristics of PPP as a procurement method. The importance of this
theme justifies the development of several studies on risk management in PPP
projects that can be clustered according to the conventional risk-management
process: identification of risks, risk analysis and risk strategies (Tang, Shen, &
Cheng, 2010). Pellegrino, Vajdic, and Carbonara (2013) review the literature on
risk identification and categorization in PPPs and divide studies into two
groups: the first group comprises studies which focus on the nature of risks,
whereas the second one contains studies which focus on the phase of project in
which the risk typically appears.
Aoust, Bennett, and Fiszelson (2000) identify other categories of risks that are
more likely to arise under a PPP project, that is, PPP-specific risks. They stem
from the particular relationship between private and public entities whose econ-
omic interests are distinctively bundled in the project and can be grouped into
three categories: fiscal risks, residual value risks and bidding risks.
A different risks’ distinction categorizes risks as exogenous and endogenous.
The former can be actively managed by changing behaviors, the latter are those
where no party can take such active steps in order to reduce either threats or
vulnerability (de Vries & Yehoue, 2013).
To best allocate risks, two questions need to be answered (OECD, 2008): (1)
which party is best able to prevent the risky event and (2) in the case where no
party can prevent the risky event (i.e. an exogenous risk), which party is best
able to manage the consequence of the adverse occurrence. To answer these ques-
tions, researchers have investigated the risk strategies adopted by the public and
the private sectors. For example, Bing et al. (2005) conduct a survey to explore
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Ke, Wang, Chan, and Lam (2010) have conducted a two-
round Delphi survey with experienced practitioners, to analyze the risks and
their preferred allocations for PPP projects in China. By furthering this study,
Ke, Wang, and Chan (2011) have conducted a series of face-to-face interviews to
collect actual risk allocations in some completed Chinese PPP projects. By compar-
ing the preferred and actual allocations and discovering the reasons behind the
differences, they develop an equitable risk allocation schema applicable in
China, and then evaluate the impact of risk misallocation (if any) on project per-
formance (Ke, Wang, & Chan, 2013). Another study involving an empirical ques-
tionnaire survey concerning PPP risk management in China was carried out by
Chan, Yeung, Yu, Wang, and Ke (2011). Focusing on a total of 34 risk factors for
PPP projects, they identify the major risks for the delivery of PPP projects in
China and investigate the perceptions of industrial practitioners and academics
on risk allocation. Ng and Loosemore (2007) discuss risk allocation in the
private provision of public infrastructure. Medda (2007) develops an analytical
model based on game theory to examine the process of risk allocation between
the public sector and the private sector in transport PPP agreements. Carbonara,
Costantino, and Pellegrino (2014a) develop a model for setting the concession
period at a value able to satisfy both the private and public sectors while fairly
allocating risks between them. Nisar (2007) discusses two strategies of transferring
risks, that is, implicit and explicit transfer of risk in PPP/PFI contractual arrange-
ments. Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) present the survey results
regarding preferred risk allocation of prime stakeholders, that is, the public
client, the construction companies and the financing institutes, and their respect-
ive risk ranking in the Greek PPP market. They found that the risks to be allocated
to the public sector are all political and legal risks, as well as risks concerning
archeological findings. Construction, operation, relationship and third-party
risks are better handled by the private sector. Project finance risks and design
risks, with the exception of availability of finance and permits, should also be
assigned to the private sector. Finally, the public and private sectors preferably
share macroeconomic, natural and social risks. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) state
that successful risk allocation should take into account the differing (and conflict-
ing) needs of the main participants involved in PPPs, that is, the procuring entity,
the project sponsors and the senior lenders. Later, Grimsey and Lewis (2004),
drawing on practical experience, present a risk matrix for the allocation of risks
in PPP projects and apply it to a case study. In this matrix, no category is assigned
in total to a specific party. Also, a number of standard risk allocation matrices have
been produced to guide appropriate risk allocation in PPP projects (Milner, 2004;
Smith, 1996).
All these studies recognized that there is not a list of risks and a risk allocation
strategy that are applicable to all PPP projects and universally agreed to as the
best. They found that the risks a PPP project may be exposed to are affected by
a number of factors, such as the type and scale of the project, the country where
the project is located and the sector. Therefore, the importance of a particular
risk and the preferred risk allocation can differ from sector to sector and/or
from country to country.
A less number of studies has dealt with risk mitigation strategies. Generally
speaking, since risk is often defined as a measure of the probability and severity
of adverse events (Lowrance, 1976), mitigation strategies are aimed at reducing
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either the probability of occurrence of risk events, by acting on risk sources, or
consequences of the risk event, when it occurs. Strategies traditionally adopted
for risk mitigation in PPP are in the form of guarantees, insurance, possibility of
changing contractual terms/clauses, etc. Such strategies can involve different
parties, for example, the private party and the government, as in the case of
revenue guarantee; the project company and the contractor who executes the
works, as in the case of the majority of construction risks or the project
company and the client, as in the case of “take and pay” or “take or pay” agree-
ments. Most of the studies on risk mitigation strategies have focused on specific
strategy to mitigate specific risk. In particular, there are a number of risk mitiga-
tion strategies for technical risks. These mitigation strategies are, in general,
defined as clauses in the agreement or some forms of guarantees provided by
one of the participants. For example, to mitigate construction risks and referring
to standard construction contract, Pfeffer (2010) proposes a Guaranteed
Maximum Price agreement, where the private party and contractor agree to cap
the price; whereas referring specifically to project financing contract, Nevitt and
Fabozzi (2005) propose completion guarantee extension AQ4to debt maturity, where
the debt will be guaranteed until maturity in the event that completion is not
achieved by a certain date.
Several strategies have been proposed to mitigate commercial risks, either in the
form of guarantees, options (i.e. to expand or contract project capacity) or mech-
anisms. These mechanisms essentially present an agreement between the public
and the private parties which defines rights and obligations if a certain event
occurs. For example, with a revenue sharing mechanism, the public sector
would have a right to claim the percentage of the revenue if the project internal
rate of return exceeds a given value and the private party has an obligation to
fulfil this claim (Gomez-Lobo & Hinojosa, 2000); with minimum revenue guaran-
tees, the concessionaire has the right to recourse to government to receive compen-
satory payments whenever the revenue is below a pre-established level
(Carbonara, Costantino, & Pellegrino, 2014b). Finally, specific mitigation strategies
are proposed for economic and financial risks. For example, interest rate guaran-
tee is released by government in order to ensure the PPP project’s financial closure
(Wibowo, 2004).
Studies focusing on risk identification and allocation in PPP projects agree that a
comprehensive view of risks associated with PPPs cannot be developed given that
the relevance of a risk and the preferred risk allocation is context-specific (sector
and/or country).
Furthermore, the contemporary literature does not provide evidence on the
more appropriate risk mitigation strategies for each risk embedded in PPP pro-
jects. This paper aims to fill this research gap. In particular, recognizing that the
relevance of risks and the choice of the appropriate risk mitigation strategies
depend on the specific PPP sector, we focus on the motorway sector and
provide guidelines for both public and private parties in defining a list of signifi-
cant risks in PPP motorway projects, and identifying for them both the effective
allocation and the suitable mitigation strategies.
3. Research Design
The present study adopts a mixed-methods research that combines quantitative
and qualitative research methods. Combining quantitative and qualitative
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research has several advantages, since it enables researchers to be more flexible
and holistic in their investigative techniques (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005)
Also, mixed-methods research addresses much more comprehensive research
purpose than quantitative or qualitative research alone (Newman, Ridenour,
Newman, & DeMarco, 2003). Indeed, by combining quantitative and qualitative
approaches within the same inquiry, investigators are able to probe further into
a matter and to use one method to enhance the interpretation of findings stem-
ming from the other method.
In our study, the mixed-methods strategy of inquiry is a sequential procedure,
where the study begins with quantitative methods, the Delphi survey, and follows
up with a qualitative method involving exploration with a few cases, multiple-
case analysis.
Being aware that a number of contextual factors are likely to influence potential
risks, their allocation and mitigation, we chose the case study approach, since it
takes into account these contextual factors much more than the quantitative
research alone (Yin, 1993).
3.1. Delphi Methodology
The research uses a Delphi technique for primary data collection. The Delphi tech-
nique is a method of eliciting and refining group judgments. It is a widely used
and accepted method for achieving convergence of opinions concerning real-
world knowledge by using a series of questionnaires to collect data from a
panel of selected subjects. Contrarily to other research techniques used to collect
expert judgments and opinions, such as focus group, nominal group, survey
and semi-structured interview, with the Delphi method there is no need for par-
ticipants to meet up and, hence, it is a relatively inexpensive method of gaining
responses. It also allows the involvement of participants from disparate geo-
graphical areas, which are generally contacted by e-mail, thus facilitating inter-
national research. Furthermore, the Delphi method overcomes some problems
of group interaction and does not allow individuals to dominate the discussion
(van Teijlingen, Pitchforth, Bishop, & Russell, 2006).
The Delphi method employs multiple iterations to reach a consensus of opinion
concerning a specific topic (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). Three main critical aspects
have to be dealt with when adopting the Delphi technique.
The first concerns the sampling, namely the choice of the number of participants
and the profile of the panel of experts. Witkin and Altschuld (1995) note that the
approximate size of a Delphi panel is generally under 50. Ludwig (1997) docu-
ments that the majority of Delphi studies have used between 15 and 20 respon-
dents. Considering factors such as the availability of resources and the expertise
of panellists, Armstrong (1985) recommends group size of n ¼ 5 to n ¼ 20. In
sum, the size of Delphi subjects is variable (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson,
1975), obviously the larger the sample size, the greater the generation of data,
which in turn influences the amount of data analysis to be undertaken. This
will lead to issues of data handling and potential analysis difficulties, particularly
if employing a qualitative first-round approach.
The second critical aspect refers to the consensus level. Unanimity is not
required in the Delphi technique; instead, a consensus level has to be pre-
determined. Dajani, Sincoff, and Talley (1979) suggest that consensus is achieved
when there is the majority of agreement on an item, that is, at least 51% of the
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respondents are in agreement, Sumsion (1998) recommends 70%, while Green,
Jones, Hughes, and Willimas (1999) opt for 80%. Alternatively, Scheibe, Skutsch,
and Schofer (1975) question the value of using percentage measures, suggesting
that the stability of the response through a series of rounds is a more reliable indi-
cator of consensus. However, measuring the percentage of votes that fall within a
prescribed range is a common approach to assess consensus (Bobeva & Day, 2005).
The third issue concerns the number of rounds that depends on the amount of
time available, whether the researcher has indicated the Delphi sequence with
one broad question or with a list of questions, and consideration of levels of
sample fatigue. The literature demonstrates that three iterations are often sufficient
to collect the needed information and to reach a consensus in most cases (Brooks,
1979; Custer, Scarcella, & Stewart, 1999; Cyphert & Gant, 1971; Green et al., 1999;
Ludwig, 1997; Rowe & Wright, 1999). A criterion generally used to set when to
stop the procedure is based on the consensus level. The researcher must be aware
of what the definition of “consensus” is in relation to the study’s findings (Williams
& Webb, 1994). If, for example, only those opinions that received over 50% agree-
ment in round two were fed back to respondents in round three, this may bias
the range of opinions from successive rounds. Outside factors such as limited
resources may also influence the level of consensus selected by the researcher.
The three discussed issues can affect the validity of the Delphi results. The lit-
erature suggests that a valid approach to check the robustness of the findings is
to undertake a Delphi study on two panels, where feedback is not exchanged
between the two panels. The similarity of the two panels independently devel-
oped findings would prove the validity of the results (Ono & Wedemeyer, 1994 AQ5;
Woudenberg, 1991).
3.1.1. Questioned research topics: risks and risk mitigation strategies for PPP
projects. In the present research, each expert was asked to anonymously express
his/her perception on the relevance of risks; the preferred risk allocation
between public and private sectors and the suitability of specific strategies in miti-
gating risks, focusing on the motorway infrastructure sector in Europe, using a
Likert scale. Key risks and risk mitigation strategies to be rated have been ident-
ified from the literature.
In particular, based on the literature review resumed in Section 2 (Aoust et al.,
2000; Beidleman, Fletcher, & Veshosky, 1990; Li, 2003; Thomas, Kalidindi, &
Ananthanarayanan, 2003; Tiong, 1990), a total of 22 risks associated with PPP
projects were identified. Figure 1 shows these risks grouped by project phase.
Tables 1–4 report the risk-management strategies for the most important risks
in PPP projects. These have been sourced in much of the relevant PPP and non-
PPP risk-management literature (see Pellegrino et al. (2013) for a comprehensive
review).
3.1.2. Questionnaire design. The above-presented catalog of risks and mitigation
strategies has been used to build the questionnaire used in the Delphi survey to
explore participants’ perceptions on: (i) the relevance of risks in the motorway
PPP projects; (ii) the preferred risk allocation between public and private
sectors and (iii) the suitability of specific strategies in mitigating risks.
The questionnaire was divided into five parts. With the aim of making uniform
the interpretation of risks used in the questionnaire, the first part provides a
description of each risk associated with PPP projects. The second part comprises
6 N. Carbonara et al.
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Figure 1. Risks in PPP projects by phase.
Table 1. Mitigation strategies for risks in the project development phase
Risk category Risk mitigation strategy
1. Pre-investment risk † Provision for refunding the bidding cost by government
† Conditional bidding allows for setting certain logical
conditions to be met before a bid is placed
† Detailed market analysis before bidding so that the
investment will be made only if the market conditions
indicate a good scenario
† Bid as a consortium involving two or more buyers
2. Site risks
2.1 Land use and acquisition/
resettlement and rehabilitation risk
† Compensation clause in concession agreement
† Provision for increase in construction/concession time
† Contingency fund for increased land cost
† Exit clause in concession agreement
† Clause of effective start date and contingent effective start
date in concession
2.2 Site condition † Site inspections and testing
2.3 Site preparation † Government can commission contamination reports,
given that government should also have greatest
knowledge of the past uses of its site
3. Financial closure risk (project finance) † Provision for alternate promoter/lender
† Provisions for grant/subsidy from government
† Alternate technology for cost reduction in case of non-
availability of full debt: choose a technology less
expensive than the original one in order to decrease the
amount of debt required
4. Design risk † Defect liability clause in contract
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Table 2. Mitigation strategies for risks in the construction phase
Risk category Risk mitigation strategy
5. Construction risks
5.1 Cost overrun † The sponsor or investors must agree to come up with the
additional capital
† Contingency fund is a percentage assigned to the budget
for overruns or unforeseen costs
† Fixed price (lump sum) contracts: the contractor/
construction company agrees to do the described and
specified project for a fixed price
† Cost-plus Fee Contract: the owner/concessionaire agrees
to pay the cost of all labor and materials plus an amount
for contractor/construction company overhead and
profit (often a set monthly fee or a fee based on a
percentage of the cost of the work)
† Guaranteed Maximum Price agreement: an owner/
concessionaire and contractor/construction company
can agree to cap the price once the project’s design is
substantially complete. Thus, a contractor who exceeds
the capped amount is responsible for the difference, and
if the total cost of the project is below the capped cost, the
owner and contractor often agree to a “shared savings”
benefit
† The sponsors provide an escrow account containing
sufficient funds to complete the project
† Take out of lenders: the loan agreement can require the
sponsor to purchase the asset and take out the lenders if
the project is not completed and operating according to
specification by a certain date
5.2 Delay in completion † Completion guarantee extension to debt maturity
guarantees that debt will be guaranteed until maturity in
the event that completion is not achieved by a certain
date
† Completion/performance guarantees insure against
financial loss from a delay in project completion
attributable to specified causes, such as a failure of a
party to perform on time
† Penalties or liquidated damages state an amount or rate
calculated in advance, usually payable by the contractor/
construction company, for a delay to a project or
performance failure. It is usually expressed in the
contract as a fixed sum, daily or weekly rate
† Supply guarantee: the contractor/construction company
insures himself/herself that the supply (i.e. material or
equipment) will be available where it is needed, when it
is needed
5.3 Failure to meet performance criteria
(quality, innovation, . . . )
† Performance guarantees are forms of financial security
provided by a party to secure the performance of the
contractual obligations of the other. It usually provides
for a monetary amount that may be called upon by the
beneficiary of the guarantee in the event of a failure of the
contractor/construction company to perform its
obligations under the contract
8 N. Carbonara et al.
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Table 3. Mitigation strategies for risks in the operation phase
Risk category Risk mitigation strategy
6. Operating risks
6.1 Operating cost overrun † Maintenance bonds
† Maintenance reserves
† Fixed price and fixed duration operation contracts
6.2 Delays or interruption in
operation
† Insurance for accidents and clean-up operations
† Fixed price and fixed duration operation contracts
† Retainage accounts (for contractor/construction company default)
6.3 Failure to meet service
quality
† Performance guarantees from operator
† Proven technology for operation and toll collection
† Warranties for hidden defects
† Performance bonus
7. Revenue risks
7.1 Changes in taxes, tariffs † Tariff guarantees
† Traffic/revenue guarantee
† Defer payments of the concession fees
7.2 Demand/usage risk † Revenue sharing mechanism: the government has a right to claim the
certain percentage of the revenue if the rate of return on the project’s
investment is above a specified value
† Revenue distribution mechanism: the government provides a
guarantee of extra revenues. In turn, the concessionaire will make
additional investments in the project and the concession will end
when the guaranteed value of revenue is collected
† Least present value of revenue mechanism: the concession ends
when a specified level of LPVR (least present value of the
accumulated revenues) had been reached
† Defer payments of the concession fees
† Expand project capacity
† Contract project capacity
† Minimum revenue guarantee
† Usage guarantee
Table 4. Mitigation strategies for risks in the project life cycle
Risk category Risk mitigation strategy
8. Asset Service level risks † Option to abandon for salvage value
9. Financial risks
9.1 Interest rate increase † Interest rate guarantee, futures, options and swaps
9.2 Inflation † Adjust concession price; debt guarantee
† Compensation payment
† Inflation caps/floors
9.3 Exchange rate † Exchange rate guarantee
9.4 Debt servicing risk † Flexible price formula to meet traffic revenue deficiencies
† Provision for revenue shortfall loan from government
† Debt reserve accounts
10. Force majeure risks † Government indemnities for force majeure; suspending clauses
11. Regulatory/political risks † Compensation from government
† Government assurances
† Offshore escrow account
† Extension of concession
† Compensation clauses from government
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questions about the respondents’ background. The third part is designed to
evaluate the relevance of risks in the motorways sector. To do this, according to
traditional method for evaluating risks, participants were asked to express their
opinion about both the probability of risk occurrence and the risk impact on the
project when it occurs. A five-point Likert scale is used as a measurement scale.
Regarding the probability of occurrence and impact, the five-point Likert scale
represents 1 ¼ very low, 2 ¼ low, 3 ¼ average, 4 ¼ high and 5 ¼ very high,
with “1” responding to “almost never occurring”/“almost no impact” to “5” cor-
responding to “almost certainty”/“heavy losses”, respectively. Respondents can
also select “not applicable” (N/A) when not sure about the score.
The fourth part concerns the risk allocation. A three-point Likert scale is used to
measure how participants perceive the allocation among contracting parties, with
1 ¼ mainly allocated to the public sector, 2 ¼ equally shared between the public
and private sectors and 3 ¼ mainly allocated to the private sector.
The last part of the questionnaire provides a list of risk mitigation strategies and
registers how participants consider each mitigation strategy suitable for mitigat-
ing risks in the motorways sector. A five-point Likert scale is used, where 1 ¼
strongly suitable, 2 ¼ suitable, 3 ¼ neutral, 4 ¼ unsuitable and 5 ¼ strongly
unsuitable. For all the questions, we ask the participants to justify their choices.
3.1.3. Procedure. To strengthen the robustness of the findings, we have con-
ducted the Delphi survey with two groups, that are independent, namely, feed-
back is not exchanged between the two groups, and differently sized, with the
second AQ6double of the first. The similarity of the two groups’ findings would
prove the validity of the results.
The target survey respondents belong to three categories: (i) practitioners in the
public sector, (ii) practitioners in the private sector and (iii) experts who have
experienced PPP projects with different roles, namely bank or financial advisors,
users, academics and consultants. For each category, we have identified and
invited to participate in the Delphi procedure 5 experts for the first panel and
10 for the second. Therefore, the initial size of the panels 1 and 2 was, respectively,
15 and 30. Two primary criteria were devised to identify the eligible participants
for this survey: (1) having extensive working experience in PPPs (in fact respon-
dents have at least 5 years of experience in PPPs) and (2) having been involved
in motorway PPP projects.
Before running the procedure with the two groups of experts, a pilot test has
been run on a small group of experts whose selection is based on their availability
to go through the procedure and to provide a detailed feedback on the clarity of
the questions.
The result of the first-round survey was consolidated and presented in the
second-round questionnaire. By doing so, the respondent could see how his/
her choice is, compared with the mean value of the rest of experts. She/he
could change her/his mind or to maintain her/his original view in the second-
round survey.
Once we have reached the 70% of consensus level on the scores above average
(4–5), below average (1–2) and average (3), for the 70% of the questions in each
part of the questionnaire, we stopped the procedure. Notice that, as for the analy-
sis of results, we have considered and reported all the responses where the
majority of opinion (51% agreement among respondents) has been reached,
since considered representative of the panel opinion.
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3.2. Multiple-case Analysis
Multiple-case study is used to study how risk is managed in real motorway PPP
projects, in order to seek convergence and corroboration of findings stemming
from the Delphi study. In fact, a case-based research method allows in depth,
multi-faceted explorations of complex issues in their real-life settings (Yin,
2009). Also, case studies allow researchers to learn about the state of the art and
to generate or test theories from practice (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987),
thus having high validity with practitioners (Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002).
We adopt a multiple-case study approach in order to make comparison across
cases. Being aware that the decision on how to select the cases is a very important
issue, we have selected eight motorway PPP projects that reflect different contexts
and have been carried out by following the same protocol of investigation. The
selected cases have been developed within the COST Action TU1001 on Public
Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends and Theory (Roumboutsos, Farrell,
Liyanage, & Macario, 2013). This choice is convenient because of the set of few
cases, representative of different and heterogeneous contexts, and offers the possi-
bility of making comparisons among countries and drawing relevant results.
4. Delphi Survey Findings
As detailed in Section 3.1.3, the invitation to participate in the survey was sent to
15 experts for the first panel and 30 for the second panel, while 11 experts for the
first panel and 10 experts for the second one actually accepted the invitation to
participate and completed the Delphi procedure. Table 5 shows the background
information of the respondents. Notice that, the panel experts have been involved
in a number of PPP projects, located in different countries, related to different
transport modes and their background covers more than one field, that is why
the total number reported in the rows 2, 3 and 4 of Table 5 exceeds 11 and 10
for panel 1 and 2, respectively. Consensus for panel 1 was achieved after the
first round, while the second Delphi panel required two rounds for consensus
to be achieved. The administration of the Delphi study was completed in about
18 months: the Delphi survey for panel 2 was carried out from March to June
2013, for panel 1 from May to November 2014.
Table 6 shows the assessments provided by the experts of the two panels on the
probability of risk occurrence and the risk impact on the project, reporting only the
answers where a 51% agreement among respondents has been reached. We label
the scores below average (1–2), average (3) and above average (4–5) for the prob-
ability as Unlikely, Likely and Very Likely, respectively, and for the impact Minor,
Moderate and Major, respectively.
As shown in Table 6, among the 22 risks listed in the questionnaire, panel 1 has
reached consensus for 19 risks and panel 2 for 18 risks, while 17 of the 22 risks
(77%) show a majority opinion (.50%) for both panels.
In order to define a list of significant risks in PPP motorway projects, we have
considered both the probability of risk occurrence and the risk impact on the
project if a risk event occurs. Figure 2 shows the Risk Probability-Impact Matrix
where the probability of occurrence is plotted on the y-axis and the risk impact
on the x-axis.
The matrix includes 17 of 22 risks listed in the questionnaire, which are those
showing a majority opinion (.50%) for both panels. The two panels have
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Table 5. Background information of the experts
(1) Perspective of the expert
Perspective Public sector Private sector (partner) Banking/financing institution Venture capitals User of services Academic Consultant
Panel 1 3 3 – – – 2 3
Panel 2 7 2 – – – – 1
(2) Transport modes of the PPP that the expert has been involved with
Mode Motorways Ports Airports Urban transport Rail Other
Panel 1 11 6 1 – 2 –
Panel 2 10 3 1 3 – 1
(3) Country of the PPP project that the expert has been involved with
Country Europe North America South America Africa Asia
Panel 1 8 3 1 1 4
Panel 2 10 – – – –
(4) Background of the expert
Field Economics Engineering Financing Banking Law
Panel 1 3 6 3 – –
Panel 2 5 6 2 1 1
(5) Years of experience in PPPs of the expert
Years 6–10 years 11–15 years Over 16 years
Panel 1 3 3 5
Panel 2 6 4 –
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Table 6. Summary of the risk assessment
Probability Impact
Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 1 Panel 2
Risk category
2. Site risks
2.2 Site condition Unlikely – Moderate –
2.3 Site preparation Unlikely Unlikely Moderate Moderate
3. Financial closure risk (project finance) Likely Likely Major Major
4. Design risk Unlikely Unlikely Moderate Moderate
5. Construction risks
5.1 Cost overrun Likely Likely Moderate Moderate
5.2 Delay in completion Unlikely Unlikely Moderate Moderate
5.3 Failure to meet performance criteria
(quality, innovation, . . . )
Unlikely Unlikely Moderate Moderate
6. Operating risks
6.1 Operating cost overrun – Unlikely – Moderate
6.2 Delays or interruption in operation Unlikely Unlikely Minor Minor
6.3 Failure to meet service quality Unlikely Unlikely Minor Minor
7. Revenue risks
7.1 Changes in taxes, tariffs Likely Unlikely Moderate Minor
7.2 Demand/usage risk Very likely Very likely Major Major
8. Asset Service Level risks Unlikely – Moderate –
9. Financial risks
9.1 Interest rate increase Very likely Very likely Major Major
9.2 Inflation Unlikely Likely Moderate Major
9.3 Exchange rate Unlikely Unlikely Minor Minor
9.4 Debt servicing risk Likely Likely Major Major
10. Force majeure events Likely Likely Major Major
11. Regulatory/political risks
11.1 Changes in legislation Unlikely Unlikely Major Major
11.2 Political interference Unlikely Unlikely Moderate Moderate
Figure 2. Risk probability-impact matrix.
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provided a different assessment to the probability and the impact of some of those
risks. Therefore, we build the matrix on the judgment expressed by panel 2 and
use the arrows where the assessment of panel 1 differs.
The matrix shows that the two panels express the same opinion for 15 risks.
Among these, a total of eight risks are classified as acceptable, two risks as unde-
sirable, a total of three risks as unacceptable and two risks are classified as cata-
strophic by both panels.
Within this list of risks, considering as key risks those classified by both panels
as unacceptable, undesirable and catastrophic, we identify seven most significant
risks in PPP motorway projects. Notice that other two risks can be considered criti-
cal since one of the two panels retains it as key: panel 1 includes changes in taxes
and tariffs (7.1), while panel 2 inflation (9.2). That is why we include these risks in
the further analysis.
Looking at the list of key risks, it is interesting to note that five out of nine are
risks that span the entire life cycle of the PPP project (Figure 1), hence they are per-
ceived as critical by the experts since they constantly threaten the project success.
For all the other key risks of the list, except for financial closure risk, the judgments
expressed by the experts are driven by the characteristics of the specific sector we
focused on, namely the motorway sector. In fact in the motorway sector, given the
complexity and the uncertainty affecting the construction phase, actual costs are
likely to be higher than the budgeted costs. Furthermore, revenue risks are per-
ceived as key because of the great uncertainty that makes an accurate estimation
of the future level and composition of traffic volumes a difficult task. At the same
time, a wrong estimation of traffic forecasts strongly affects the profitability of the
project, especially if direct user charges, such as tolls, are the main source of cash
flow for the PPP project.
As for the risk allocation, a consensus level higher than 51% has been reached
for all the questions by both panels. Focusing on the identified key risks, the
panels agree that financial closure risk, cost overrun, interest rate increase,
inflation and debt servicing risk should be allocated to the private sector; while
force majeure risks, changes in legislation and demand/usage risk should be
equally shared between the two parties (Table 7). Results are coherent with the
widely accepted principle of allocating risks to the party best able to manage
Table 7. Key risks allocation matrix
Private Equally shared Public
3. Financial closure risk (project finance) 3
5. Construction risks
5.1 Cost overrun 3
7. Revenue risks
7.1 Changes in taxes, tariffs 3
7.2 Demand/usage risk 3
9. Financial risks
9.1 Interest rate increase 3
9.2 Inflation 3
9.4 Debt servicing risk 3
10. Force majeure risks 3
11. Regulatory/political risks
11.1 Changes in legislation 3
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them. Even for the other risks not listed in the table, namely those judged accep-
table, the answers on their allocation seem to be based on the same principle. For
example, political interference is the only risks allocated to the public sector.
Finally, as concerns the identification of the suitable mitigation strategies, Table
8 shows the mitigation strategies judged suitable (S) (either score 5 or 4 in the
Likert scale) by both panels for the identified key risks. Notice that we have
also retained strategies judged suitable by one panel and neutral by the other,
being the score “Neutral” (N) not discriminant.
The two panels have expressed the same opinion on more than half of the risk
mitigation strategies listed in Table 8. As for the others, it does not emerge a diver-
gence of opinion since “Neutral” does not mean unsuitability.
The results of the Delphi study show a significant convergence of opinions
among the experts of the two panels on the identification, allocation and mitiga-
tion of key risks, although the different composition of the two panels in terms
of experts perspective.
Table 8. Suitable mitigation strategies for key risks
Risk category Risk mitigation strategy Panel 1 Panel 2
3. Financial closure risk (project
finance)
† Provision for alternate promoter/lender S S
5. Construction risks
5.1 Cost overrun † Additional capital S S
† Fixed price (lump sum) contracts S S
† Guaranteed Maximum Price agreement S S
† Escrow account to complete the project S S
† Take out of lenders S N
7. Revenue risks
7.1 Changes in taxes tariffs † Tariff guarantees S N
† Traffic/revenue guarantee S N
† Defer payments of the concession fees S N
7.2 Demand/usage risk † Revenue sharing mechanism S S
† Revenue distribution mechanism S S
† Least present value of revenue mechanisms S N
† Minimum revenue guarantee S N
† Usage guarantee S N
9. Financial risks
9.1 Interest rates increase † Interest rate guarantee, futures, options and
swaps
S S
9.2 Inflation † Adjust concession price; debt guarantee S S
† Compensation payment S N
† Inflation caps/floors S S
9.4 Debt servicing risk † Flexible price formula to meet traffic revenue
deficiencies
S S
† Debt reserve accounts S S
10. Force majeure risks † Government indemnities S N
11. Regulatory/political risks
11.1 Changes in legislation † Compensation from government S S
† Government assurances S S
† Extension of concession S S
† Compensation clauses from government S S
Note: N, neutral; S, suitable.
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5. Risk Management in Practice: Delphi Results vs. Multiple-case Analysis
The results of the Delphi survey are compared with the common practices on risk
management applied in eight real road and motorway PPP projects. Cases range
from conventional toll motorways in Greece through a road tunnel in the Nether-
lands financed by availability payments, to an airport access road built by the
Flemish Government using a public sector corporate entity and a shadow
Design-Build-Finance-Maintenance (DBFM) agreement. Table 9 synthetizes the
main characteristics of the eight PPP projects.
The multiple-case study analysis provides interesting insights if compared with
the Delphi survey results. As concerns the relevance of risks in PPP motorway pro-
jects, the cases confirm the experts’ opinion for the revenue risks while do not
report evidences on the criticality of interest rate risk. In particular, most of the
analyzed cases show that the demand/usage risk has a severe impact on the
project and remains one of the major issues driving the renegotiation process.
The perception of the criticality of the revenue risks has induced in the A19 Dish-
forth Design-Build-Finance-Operation (DBFO) and in the M80 Stepps To Haggs
DBFO projects to use shadow tolls as the mechanism for repaying the concessio-
naire, while in the BNRR M6 Toll project, to protect the concessionaire from
drop of revenues in a period of economic decline, the special purpose vehicle
(SPV) AQ7has a high degree of autonomy in how it sets the level of tolls, specifically
the SPV is allowed to review tolls on a six-monthly cycle. In the Attica Tollway
project, because sponsors considered that the road traffic levels and the tolls the
users were prepared to pay were not enough to provide an adequate return on
the investment, a strong financial help from the Greek Government was necessary.
The traffic volume drop due to the Greek sovereign debt crisis has affected the
demand risk both in the Ionia Odos Motorway and in the Olympia Odos Motor-
way projects as perceived by the private sector, and is expected to have a decisive
role on the final renegotiated contract structure, mainly through the amendment of
the toll revenue sharing mechanisms during the operational period.
Table 9. Projects overview
Name Country Type
Contract
duration Budget Source
A19 Dishforth
DBFO
UK Brownfield 30 years GBP 29,4M Boles and Liyanage
(2013a AQ29)
Attica Tollway,
Athens Ring
Road
Greece Brownfield and
Greenfield AQ30
25 years Eur 1300M Halkias, Roumboutsos,
and Pantelia (2013)
Coen Tunnel The
Netherlands
Brownfield and
Greenfield
30 years Eur 571M Voordijk (2013)
Ionia Odos
Motorway
Greece Brownfield and
Greenfield
30 years Eur 1200M Nikolaidis and
Roumboutsos (2013)
BNRR M6 Toll UK Brownfield and
Greenfield
53 years GBP 900M Liyanage and Boles
(2013) AQ31
M80 Stepps to
Haggs DBFO
UK Brownfield and
Greenfield
33 years GBP
251,4M
Boles and Liyanage
(2013b AQ32)
Olympia Odos
Motorway
Greece Brownfield and
Greenfield
30 years Eur 2200M Roumboutsos and
Nikolaidis (2013)
Via-Invest
Zaventem
Belgium Brownfield and
Greenfield
30 years Eur
219,85M
van den Hurk and Van
Gestel (2013)
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As for the interest rate risk, the analysis of cases does not highlight any critical-
ity on it that indeed is perceived as catastrophic by experts. This can be explained
by noticing that after the financial crisis the interest rates constantly decrease in
the countries where the cases are located.
As for the risk allocation, the practices adopted in the cases are not completely
aligned with the opinion of experts involved in the Delphi survey (Table 10).
Specifically, for the construction risks and financial risks we found a full coherence
between the practices adopted in the real projects and the opinion of experts. In
most of the analyzed cases, both types of risk are allocated to the private party
according to the opinion of experts. Differently, the allocation of the other risks,
namely revenue, force majeur and regulatory/political risks, does not match
with the results of the Delphi survey.
Particularly, in most of the analyzed projects, the revenue risks are allocated to
the private party, while experts express the opinion that revenue risks should be
equally shared. Actually, such a divergence is only apparent. In practice, in fact,
the mitigation strategies usually adopted, namely revenue sharing mechanisms
and/or strong financial support provided by the public sector in the form of guar-
antees, confirm that there exists a substantial risk sharing between the two parties.
Table 10. Projects’ risk allocation matrix
Risks Private Equally shared Public
Construction risks M80 Stepps-Haggs A19 Dishforth Coen Tunnel
Attica Tollway
Ionia Odos
BNRR M6 Toll
Olympia Odos
Via-Invest Zaventem
Revenue risks A19 Dishforth M80 Stepps-Haggs Via-Invest Zaventem
Attica Tollway
Coen Tunnel
Ionia Odos
BNRR M6 Toll
Olympia Odos
Financial risks A19 Dishforth Coen Tunnel
BNRR M6 Toll
M80 Stepps-Haggs
Attica Tollway Via-Invest Zaventem
Ionia Odos
Olympia Odos
Force majeur risks M80 Stepps-Haggs Via-Invest Zaventem A19 Dishforth
Attica Tollway
Ionia Odos
BNRR M6 Toll
Olympia Odos
Coen Tunnel
Regulatory/political risks M80 Stepps-Haggs A19 Dishforth
Attica Tollway
Ionia Odos
Olympia Odos
Via-Invest Zaventem
BNRR M6 Toll
Coen Tunnel
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At the same time, those cases where the revenue risks have not been shared
incurred in costly renegotiation processes, as for the Ionia Odos Motorway and
Olympia Odos Motorway projects. Then, the common international practices
actually confirm the experts’ opinion. As for the allocation of force majeur and
regulatory/political risks, in most of the analyzed cases these are borne by the
public sector, while according to the experts they should be preferably equally
shared. Such a result comes out of the negotiation process where the government,
recognizing them out of the private party control, accepts to bear these risks to
assure the long-term success of the PPP and indemnify the private sector
against them. This confirms that mitigation strategies conventionally adopted to
mitigate these risks are government indemnities, assurances and compensation,
as pointed out by the experts involved in the Delphi survey.
6. Conclusions
One of the critical aspects that affects the success of a PPP project is the risk man-
agement. Recognizing that the relevance of risks, the establishment of an accepta-
ble risk allocation scheme and the choice of the appropriate risk mitigation
strategies depend on the specific PPP sector, we focus on the motorway sector.
Based on the results of a Delphi survey, we define a list of significant risks in
PPP motorway projects, prepare a practical risk allocation matrix and identify
the appropriate strategies to mitigate each identified key risk.
The research findings indicate that the most critical risks in PPP motorway pro-
jects are both endogenous and exogenous to the project. As regards the first cat-
egory, the most significant, for its high probability of occurrence and its high
impact, is the demand/usage risk which is one of the revenue risks that occurs
during the Operation phase. For this catastrophic risk, the two panels fully agree
that it should be preferably allocated equally between the two parties, and that
the suitable risks mitigation strategies are Revenue sharing mechanism and Revenue
distribution mechanism. Other endogenous key risks, less severe than the previous
one, are cost overrun and financial closure risk, classified as undesirable and unaccep-
table, respectively. The former occurs in the Construction phase and, coherently
with its nature, the preferred risk allocation is to the private party. Multifarious
strategies can be adopted to effectively mitigate this risk. The latter occurs
during the project Development phase and, being related to the project financing,
should be preferably allocated to the private party. The risk mitigation strategy
judged suitable by the experts is the Provision for alternate promoter/lender.
The key risks exogenous to the project, due to factors outside the control of the
project parties, can occur during the entire life cycle of the PPP project. Most of
them depend on the economic/financial and institutional contexts where the
project is developed while only one refers to force majeure events. Among
these, financial risks should be preferably allocated to the private sector, and mul-
tifarious strategies can be adopted to effectively mitigate these risks. Regulatory
and force majeure risks should be equally shared, the former can be mitigated
through different strategies while, for the force majeure risks, the panels identify
as suitable mitigation strategy the Government indemnities.
The results of the Delphi survey have been compared with the common prac-
tices on risk management applied in eight real road and motorway PPP projects.
All the analyzed cases confirm that the demand risk is the one with the greater
impact on the project and remains the major issues driving the renegotiation
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process. We found that this risk is mostly allocated to the private sector, but, in the
practice, the public party protects the concessionaire by revenue shortfalls by
using shadow tolls as mechanisms for repayment to the concessionaire or by
allowing the concessionaire to increase tariffs so as to ensure that the project is
self-financed, unless incurring into costly and extensive renegotiation processes
between the two parties.
Contrarily, the analyzed cases do not report evidences on the criticality of inter-
est rate risk, which is not considered as an issue in the countries where the cases are
located, given the decreasing trend of the Interest rate in last years.
The research findings presented in this paper will support both the public and
private sectors in understanding the key risks, establishing an effective risk allo-
cation and adopting the most effective mitigation strategies. Main managerial
implications of the study are informing the parties in the negotiation process so
as to avoid costly renegotiation and in the more risky phases and activities of
the project so as strengthening control and monitoring measures.
A major limitation of this study is that the guidelines are developed without
considering the correlation among risks, that is, by assuming that each risk is inde-
pendent of each other. This issue will be addressed in future work by investigating
whether mitigation strategies conceived relatively to the separated risks are still
effective once risks occur combined together.
Further researches will be carried out mainly in two directions. Firstly we
intend to replicate the study for the other transport modes, thus providing com-
prehensive guidelines for risk management in transport PPP. Secondly, we
intend to investigate if and how the global financial crisis impacts on the risk
assessment and thus on the identification of the key risks in PPP motorway pro-
jects, their allocation and mitigation.
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